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1. Introduction. 
It is well known that Ryanair is the most important and successful 
European airline. Founded in 1985 with a share capital of just GBP 1, and 
a staff of 25 people, the company organised initially only daily flights on a 
15-seater Bandeirante aircraft, operating from Waterford, in the 
southeast of Ireland, to London Gatwick Airport. After a first period of 
growth at the end of the Eighties, during the beginning of the Nineties 
Ryanair faced a crisis due both to the competition of other airlines and to 
the Gulf War. The company, however, reacted adopting the ‘low fares 
business model’, copied from the American Southwest Airline, and 
becoming, therefore, the first low-cost airline in Europe, under the 
guidance of Michael O’Leary, its actual CEO. Following this new business 
model, today Ryanair carries over 130 million passengers a year, on 
more than 2,000 daily flights from 86 bases, connecting 215 destinations 
in 37 countries on a fleet of 430 Boeing 737 aircraft1. 
However, the success of Ryanair hides negative sides. Indeed, during 
the last years, pilots and cabin crews have organised several collective 
actions against the low-cost airline, revealing the real working conditions 
imposed by the company. Ryanair creates some legal ambiguities, 
exploiting especially the transnational nature of its performances, from 
which it takes advantage to cut down on labour costs. In a report 
commissioned by the European Transport Workers’ Federation, Ryanair 
was defined ‘a “short haul fundamentalist” that leads the industry in 
terms of driving down costs and developing new ancillary sources of 
revenue’2. 
The present article aims at analysing the Ryanair case in the Italian 
and European framework from a twofold point of view: labour law and 
industrial relations.  
Firstly, the working conditions in the airline company are described. 
It is well known that Ryanair requires an absolute secrecy about this. 
However, the employment dimensions reached by the company and the 
increasing union conflict have brought out recently documentation and 
evidences which let us to have a clear view of the current labour 
relationships in Ryanair. The intention here is therefore to provide an 
overview of the Ryanair’s working conditions, verifying if the airline 
company adopts a strategy of limitation of employment protections 
                                                          
1 For these information and the complete Ryanair’s history see 
https://corporate.ryanair.com/about-us/history-of-ryanair/ (accessed 19 Oct. 2018). 
2 G. Harvey and P. Turnbull, The Development of the Low Cost Model in the European Civil 
Aviation Industry. Final Report for the European Transport Workers’ Federation (ETF) 
(2012). 
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directed to reduce costs and increase productivity. In the light of this, it is 
necessary to understand if EU transnational labour law has sufficient 
instruments to face law and forum shopping or if, on the contrary, the so-
called ‘EU social deficit’3 has affected also this sector, giving life to gaps 
exploited by companies to subjugate labour relationships to the most 
advantageous legislation and competent jurisdiction for themselves.  
Taking into account all of this, secondly, an overview of transnational 
issues (mainly concerning employment contract law, social security law 
and competent jurisdiction) is provided, considering also the solutions 
offered by the EU Institutions, so far.  
Thirdly, the Ryanair approach to industrial relations is addressed, in 
order to understand the position of the Irish company in respect of Trade 
Unions. Even here, the transnational nature of labour relationships in 
Ryanair produces important implications both making more difficult 
building a collective interest among workers4 and facilitating the escape 
from any kind of confrontation with Trade Unions and the rejection of the 
collective phenomenon itself in its multifaced dimensions by the 
company. 
Finally, some conclusions are drawn, with the aim of pointing out the 
importance of the Ryanair case in the European and Italian legal and 
industrial relations framework.  
2. The working conditions in Ryanair. 
As every other airline, Ryanair workers are structured in ground crew 
and flight crew. Both are fundamental for the functioning of Ryanair 
business model, based on ‘25 minutes turnarounds’, namely to prepare 
the aircraft in this time to do as many flights as possible and thus to keep 
the prices low5. Specifically, the flight crew is composed of cabin crew 
and pilots. 
Cabin crew are in their turn articulated in a hierarchical manner. At 
the top there is the ‘Base Supervisor’, followed by the ‘Deputy Base 
Supervisor’ and by the ‘Cabin Service Supervisor’. The lowest positions 
for cabin crews are ‘Junior’ and ‘ad hoc Junior’.  
Not all of these workers are directly hired by Ryanair. Indeed, ‘Junior’ 
are employed by two Irish employment agencies controlled by Ryanair 
itself, Workforce and Crewlink, providing workers to the airline. Thus, 
Ryanair insists on applying Irish labour, social security and tax law to 
                                                          
3 See, inter alia, S. Giubboni, Diritti e solidarietà in Europa. I modelli sociali nazionali nello 
spazio giuridico europeo, il Mulino 47 (2008).  
4 See A. Loffredo, Democrazia aziendale, imprese transnazionali e dumping sociale, 
Editoriale Scientifica 42-43 (2018), speaking of transnational road transports. 
5 Crewlink, The Rough Guide to Working for Crewlink. Operating on Ryanair Aircraft, 5-6. 
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these relationships, saving the related costs due to the advantages given 
by the flexibility of Irish law, as well as avoiding the employer’s 
accountability6.  
Cabin crew have to attend a training course (approximately of six 
months) to work in Ryanair, which is provided by the agencies mentioned 
and costs between EUR 2,400 and 3,000, at the expense of workers7. 
Also pilots are organised hierarchically. Their highest positions are 
‘Base Chief Pilot’ and ‘Captain’, followed by the lower ‘Senior First Officer’ 
and ‘First Officer’. 
In the majority of cases, however, pilots are not hire as employees 
but work for Ryanair, formally, under the legal status of self-employed, 
so that they are not entitled to sick pay and paid leave. 
The airline company has set a specific strategy with the aim of 
circumvent tax law. Indeed, pilots have been obliged to found (and often 
to become directors of) several limited service companies guided by 
accountants chosen by Ryanair itself and registered in countries, such as 
Ireland, Slovakia, Cyprus, Malta and Isle of Man, where the tax regime is 
particularly favourable. Those service companies have contracts with 
agencies, such as Brookfield Aviation and McGinley Aviation, which then 
supply pilots to Ryanair. Thus, on the one side, the mentioned contract 
contains a clause according to which the pilot agrees not to be a 
Ryanair’s or agency’s employee and the agency is actually neither an 
agent of Ryanair nor has any power to bind Ryanair in any matter, 
without obligations for the airline company to hire pilots from the agency. 
On the other side, the responsibility of all pilots’ performances’ tax and 
social security payments falls on services companies, i.e. on pilots 
themselves. Moreover, the contract between the agency and Ryanair 
provides that if the pilot publishes derogatory statements in writing or on 
the internet (in private or public chatrooms) about the agency or Ryanair, 
the relationship will be terminated8. 
Even pilots are required to attend a training course to work for 
Ryanair, partially at their expenses. But if they resign after the 
recruitment, pilots have to refund the airline company all the training 
                                                          
6 S. Borelli, Parlando di welfare e barbarie, oggi, 42 Ragion pratica 99, 103 (2014). 
7 Ryanair, Ryanair Cabin Crew Pay and Conditions, paras 7 and 9, 
https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/work-and-
pensions/Correspondence/Letter-from-Ryanair-21-12-17.pdf (accessed 13 Oct. 2018). 
8 For these reasons many Ryanair’s pilots have been under investigation of the UK’s HM 
Revenue & Customs during the last years (See 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/oct/03/ryanair-pilots-hmrc-investigation-
airlines-uk; see also https://www.irishtimes.com/business/transport-and-tourism/hiring-of-
ryanair-pilots-not-a-straightforward-arrangement-1.1541382 (both accessed 20 Oct. 2018). 
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costs9. These contract terms are indeed accepted by pilots for a specific 
reason, namely the fact that Ryanair hires also pilots without any flight 
experience, while the other airlines generally require at least 1,500 hours 
to fly10. In other words, pilots use the Irish airline company as a sort of 
‘flying school’11. 
The contractual and working conditions of Ryanair employees and 
temporary agency workers are similar. As Ryanair’s aircrafts are 
registered in Ireland, the airline claims that employment is based in 
Ireland, although contractual home base is in another State12, and the 
Irish law and jurisdiction shall be applied13. For the same reason the 
airline company does not fulfil its administrative obligations, such as to 
communicate to the Public Administration the changes in the labour 
relationships (e.g. recruitments or dismissals) or to deliver to workers 
mandatory documents (e.g. the employment contract) and argues that 
the only applicable sanctions in case of breach of administrative law are 
the Irish14.   
Basic gross salaries15 include a premium for every hour associated 
with flight duty, as well as for Sunday and bank holiday working16. 
Furthermore, salaries are reviewed every year depending on the workers 
performances17 and can be increased through bonus awards on in-flight 
sales18. In this sense, Ryanair monitors continuously cabin crew 
performances and, when they fall below the standard set or on board 
                                                          
9 See https://www.irishtimes.com/business/transport-and-tourism/judge-refuses-to-award-
ryanair-damages-against-pilot-1.3460768 (accessed 20 Oct. 2018). 
10 Indeed, according to FCL.510.A (B), Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1178/2011 of 3 
November 2011 laying down technical requirements and administrative procedures related 
to civil aviation aircrew, ‘Applicants for an ATPL(A) shall have completed a minimum of 1 
500 hours of flight time in aeroplanes’, where ATPL is the Airline Transport Pilot Licence. 
11 This explains why a large majority of ANPAC (the Italian National Professional Association 
of Civil Aviation) pilots have subscribed a dubious agreement signed by ANPAC itself in 
August 2018 (see Chapter 4, infra). 
12 Ryanair Junior Customer Service Supervisor contract s. 5.1; Crewlink Customer Services 
Agent contract s. 6. 
13 Ryanair Junior Customer Service Supervisor contract s. 34; Crewlink Customer Services 
Agent contract s. 37. 
14 Cf. Tribunale di Pisa 8 October 2018, No. 380, on which see S. Borelli, La guerra al 
Ryanair Business Model. Le battaglie di Boscoducale, Busto Arsizio I, Bergamo e Pisa, 
forthcoming in Rivista Giuridica del Lavoro e della Previdenza Sociale; Tribunale di Bologna 
24 September 2015, No. 17149. 
15 Which for temporary workers are calculated on scheduled block hour basis (see Crewlink 
Customer Services Agent contract s. 7). 
16 Junior Customer Service Supervisor contract s. 6; Crewlink Customer Services Agent 
contract s. 7. 
17 Junior Customer Service Supervisor contract s. 6; Crewlink Customer Services Agent 
contract s. 8. 
18 Junior Customer Service Supervisor contract s. 7. 
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sales are not satisfying, the worker can be subjected to a disciplinary 
procedure and eventually dismissed19. This system facilitates a strong 
competition among workers and pushes them to report each other20.  
Moreover, Ryanair exercises a strong surveillance power on workers, 
using the so-called ‘mystery passengers’, cabin crews dressed-up like 
passengers who check the colleagues’ performances21. The company 
reserves also the right to conduct a personal search of cabin crew and 
their belongings22 and to control communications made through the 
company devices by workers23.  
There is not a formal working time as Ryanair can ask the cabin crew 
to perform their functions/provide their service in every moment 
discretionally, also on Saturdays, Sundays and public holydays, without 
additional remuneration24. Although paid holydays can be requested and 
granted, they depend on the passengers’ demand, thus, especially in the 
peak season, the company can cancel or rearrange holydays25. Moreover, 
according to some former Ryanair’s workers, the Irish employer does not 
tolerate sick leaves. Generally, workers, after having informed the 
company of their symptoms and diseases, have to fill in on the same day 
a self-certificate and fax it to some offices in Dublin, without knowing 
who will read their personal data. If then the worker gets sick 3 times in 
6 months she/he will have to face a meeting in Dublin, although the 
illness has been certified by a doctor. For this reason, according to some 
former Ryanair’s cabin crew, frequently many workers go to work sick to 
avoid problems26. 
Workers have to provide meals at their expenses27, keeping the 
uniforms cleaned28, as well as paying the airport identity card and the 
                                                          
19 Crewlink, supra n. 5, 9 and 27. 
20 See http://www.cislcatania.it/Media/Files/Lettera-Ryanair-_inglese_ (accessed 13 Oct. 
2018). 
21 Ibidem. 
22 Junior Customer Service Supervisor contract s. 28; Crewlink Customer Services Agent 
contract s. 27. 
23 Crewlink, supra n. 5, 49. 
24 Junior Customer Service Supervisor contract s. 9; Crewlink Customer Services Agent 
contract s. 9. 
25 Junior Customer Service Supervisor contract s. 10; Crewlink Customer Services Agent 
contract s. 10. 
26 See http://www.cislcatania.it/Media/Files/Lettera-Ryanair-_inglese_ (accessed 13 Oct. 
2018). 
27 According to Junior Customer Service Supervisor contract s. 8, only filtered water is free 
of charge on board for cabin crew.  
28 Junior Customer Service Supervisor contract s. 17; Crewlink Customer Services Agent 
contract s. 18. 
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staff car parking costs29. When Ryanair pays, these costs are deducted 
from the workers’ salaries30.   
If for some reasons (for example seasonal) the company has excess 
capacity, it can give workers compulsory unpaid leaves, discretionally31. 
Ryanair workers cannot spread ‘confidential information’ about the 
company during and after the labour relationship. Breaking this rule is 
considered as a gross misconduct leading to an instant summary 
dismissal. However, here ‘confidentiality’ is a very broad concept, 
including ‘staff’ information and ‘any other information of a kind that 
would usually be regarded as secret or confidential’32. In the light of this, 
contacting Trade Unions is forbidden in practice33.  
Moreover, in some cases Ryanair has gone further. Indeed, the 
airline company has concluded with their cabin crews specific contracts 
named ‘Cabin Crew Agreement for Crew Operation’ containing a 
termination clause (‘termination/review of agreement’) which provides 
that the contract will be terminated if the worker participates to work 
stoppages or collective actions. Furthermore, in case of Trade Unions 
recognition or of any kind of collective action, all wage increases, 
allowances or shift changes granted by the company itself will be 
withdrawn and the whole employment contract will be considered null 
and void34. 
3. Law and forum shopping in Ryanair: exploiting 
transnationality. 
The competitiveness of Ryanair, on which its commercial success is 
based, results from the possibility to compensate the reduction of 
consumers’ fees with a considerable saving of above all (but not only) 
labour costs. These savings are obtained, as seen above, compressing 
employment protections at most, thanks to the law shopping practice, 
which the EU legislation has not been able to eradicate from the internal 
market, yet. Taking advantage of the peculiarity of the flight crews’ 
activities, the company has positioned itself in the grey areas of the 
                                                          
29 Junior Customer Service Supervisor contract ss 13-14; Crewlink Customer Services Agent 
contract ss 15-16. 
30 Junior Customer Service Supervisor contract s. 29; Crewlink Customer Services Agent 
contract s. 28. 
31 Junior Customer Service Supervisor contract s. 23; Crewlink Customer Services Agent 
contract ss 21-22. 
32 Junior Customer Service Supervisor contract s. 21; Crewlink Customer Services Agent 
contract s. 20. 
33 See http://www.cislcatania.it/Media/Files/Lettera-Ryanair-_inglese_ (accessed 13 Oct. 
2018). 
34 Tribunale di Bergamo 30 March 2018, No. 1586.  
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European discipline on the applicable law (contract law and social security 
law) and on the competent jurisdiction indistinctly concerning 
transnational relationships in general. 
However, more targeted reforms and recent decisions of the EU 
Court of Justice are eroding the foundations on which the Ryanair system 
was built. 
First, Regulation 465/2012 added paragraph 5 to Article 11 
Regulation 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems. The 
general criterion that the 2004 Regulation (substantially in continuity with 
the repealed Regulation 1408/1971) choose to identify the applicable 
national law in the field of social security was the lex loci laboris, namely 
the law of the place where the activity is performed35. This general 
principle is then specified and, in some ways, strengthened36 by the 
introduction of the notion of ‘substantial part of his activity’ in relation to 
the situation of who habitually exercises an activity in two or more 
Member States. In this case, the legislation of the Member State of 
residence is applied if a ‘substantial part’ of the activity is performed 
there37, and this expression must be understood – as specified in the 
implementing Regulation 987/2009 – as ‘a quantitatively substantial part 
of all activities of the employed ... person ..., without this being the 
major part of those activities’38. If, instead, a ‘substantial part’ of the 
activity is not exercised in the State of residence, the worker is subject to 
the legislation of the Member States where the employer is established. 
Until 2012, therefore, the identification of the social security regime 
applicable to Ryanair flight crews was conducted on the basis of these 
criteria set by EU legislation for the generality of transnational 
performances. The critical point of this system relating to the civil 
aviation sector was constituted by the fact that, given the peculiarities of 
the flight crews’ performances, a ‘substantial part’ of the activity was not 
always easily identifiable. As a consequence, according to the mechanism 
described above, the subsidiary criterion of the place of registration of 
the employer’s office should have been applied. In the case of Ryanair, 
the result wished by the company was reached, namely the application of 
the Irish law on social security. 
                                                          
35 Regulation 883/2004 Art. 11(3)(A). 
36 S. Giubboni, La sicurezza sociale dei lavoratori che si spostano all’interno dell’Unione 
europea, 598 (S. Sciarra & B. Caruso eds., Giappichelli 2008). 
37 Regulation 883/2004 Art. 13(1)(A). 
38 According to Regulation 987/2009 Art. 14(8) ‘an indicator that a substantial part of the 
activities is not being pursued in the relevant Member State’ means that, globally, in that 
same country the service has not been performed for a quota corresponding to at least 25% 
of the working hours and/or salaries. 
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Aware of the possible abuses in respect of flight crews stemming 
from the legal system built in 2004, the EU legislator, with the 
aforementioned Regulation 465/2012, added to Article 11 Regulation 
883/2004 a provision specifically addressed to this sector. According to 
the ‘home base’ criterion, introduced in that occasion39, the social 
security system of the State in which the crew member usually begins 
and ends a period of service or a series of periods of service and in 
which, under normal conditions, the employer company is not responsible 
for providing the accommodation to the worker must be applied to flight 
crews40. 
The amendment, by anchoring the identification of the social security 
legislation applicable to the place where the worker starts/ends the 
performance, enhances the principle of effectiveness and thus seems to 
be effective in order to combat the law shopping41. However, given that - 
for civil aviation security purposes - airlines are required to identify the 
home base for each crew member, the national legislation on social 
security can be determined simply by verifying the place formally 
qualified as such by the company at the time of hiring or later42. 
Another issue in the Ryanair system is - as mentioned - the result of 
the interpretation accepted by the EU Court of Justice regarding the 
criterion to identify the law applicable to flight crews’ employment 
contracts and the jurisdiction over the disputes in this respect. 
Ryanair’s position has always been to support the applicability of 
Irish law and the jurisdiction of that country’s judge on flight crews’ 
relationships. This by virtue of various elements: in the employment 
contracts there is a clause for the election of the forum and another that 
designates Irish law as the applicable law; the execution of the service 
takes place on aircrafts registered in Ireland43; the employment contract 
                                                          
39 Regulation 883/2004 Art. 11(5). 
40 This definition of ‘home base’ is contained in Annex III, Chapter Q of Regulation 
3922/1991, recalled by the new Regulation 883/2004 Art. 11(5). 
41 S. Borelli, supra n. 6, 105; S. Sciarra, Un confronto a distanza: il diritto di sciopero 
nell’ordinamento globale, 2-3 Politica del Diritto 221-222 (2012).  
42 G. Frosecchi, La legge previdenziale applicabile ai lavoratori di compagnie aeree 
internazionali. I casi Ryanair, 1 Rivista Giuridica del Lavoro e della Previdenza Sociale 117 
(2016). For some courts (see Tribunale di Bologna 24 September 2015, No. 17149), the 
reference to the home base may only concern disputes arising after the date of the 
enforcement of Regulation 465/2012 (28 June 2012). The same could be said for the 
criterion of the ‘substantial part’ of the activity pursuant to Regulation 883/2004 Art. 13 and 
Regulation 987/2009 Art. 14 (become fully operational only from 1 May 2010). However, 
see infra in this chapter. 
43 See para. 2, supra. More specifically, as Article 17 of Chicago Convention (Convention on 
International Civil Aviation) provides that ‘Aircraft have the nationality of the State in which 
they are registered’, Ryanair and Crewlink claim that the performance would be habitually 
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is concluded when Ryanair signs it at its registered office in Ireland, after 
the worker has signed it (wherever occurred). 
However, for the EU legislation, the main criterion to identify the 
applicable law and the competent jurisdiction is lex loci laboris 
(respectively, Article 8 Regulation 593/200844 and Article 21 Regulation 
1215/201245). Instead, the criterion of the place of the country where the 
place of business through which the employee was engaged is situated is 
applicable when it is not possible to identify the place where or from 
which46 the employee habitually carries out the performance47.  
This system is inspired by the principle of favor laboris48, which 
circumscribes the role of the parties’ contractual autonomy. In fact, these 
may choose to submit the contractual relationship to the law or 
jurisdiction of a Member State other than that determined according to 
                                                                                                                                                      
carried out on the Irish territory, namely on Irish aircraft, because workers spend more time 
on flight than on the ground (see Opinion of Advocate General H. Saugmandsgaard Øe 
delivered on 26 April 2017, point 121). This latter view has been adopted by Tribunale di 
Bologna 24 September 2015, No. 17149, which on this basis has excluded that Ryanair 
must comply with Italian employer’s administrative obligations, because the only applicable 
legislation is the Irish.  
44 Which replaces the Rome Convention of 19 June 1980, still applied to the judgments 
established until 17 December 2009. 
45 Which replaces Regulation 44/2001, still applied to disputes rooted before 10 January 
2015. 
46 The clarification - very important for flight crews - that locus laboris is also that from 
which the work activity is usually carried out is contained in Regulation 593/2008 and in 
Regulation 1215/2012, following an extensive interpretation in this sense of the Court of 
Justice (ECJ 13 July 1993, C-125/92, Mulox IBC, paras 24 et seq.). 
47 Only for the determination of the law applicable to the employment contract it is instead 
provided that ‘where it appears from the circumstances as a whole that the contract is more 
closely connected with a country other than that … [in which or from which the employee 
habitually carries out his work or where the place of business through which the employee 
was engaged is situated], the law of that other country shall apply’  (Regulation 593/2008 
Art. 8(4), in continuity with the Rome Convention of 1980). However, in order to avoid that 
this criterion overemphasizes the discretion of the judge (and ultimately makes the 
prediction of the other two irrelevant), a strict and restrictive interpretation is now desired 
in order to make the latter criterion residual with respect to others (see G. Orlandini, Il 
rapporto di lavoro con elementi di internazionalità, 137 W.P. C.S.D.L.E. “Massimo 
D’Antona”.IT 20-21 (2012). 
48 See the whereas 23 Regulation 593/2008 and 18 Regulation 1215/2012. It has been 
claimed (see A. Lyon-Caen & S. Sciarra, La Convenzione di Roma e i principi del diritto del 
lavoro, 20 Quaderni di Diritto del Lavoro e delle Relazioni Industriali 22 (1998) and G. 
Orlandini, supra n. 42, 10) that the law referred to seems actually to be more properly 
inspired by the principle of ‘proximity’. This because it does not aim at allowing the worker 
the application of the most favorable national discipline among those possible, but only to 
identify in the one (presumably) closest to him the applicable law (and the competent 
jurisdiction). 
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the aforementioned criteria only in compliance with the mandatory rules 
of the latter’s legal system49 and under specific conditions50. 
As easily understandable, the element of uncertainty here is 
represented by the concept of ‘place in which (or from which) the 
employee habitually carries out his work’. It is precisely on this point that 
the case law of the Court of Justice provides its most significant 
contribution in this area. In fact, the judge of Luxembourg - first with 
reference to the law applicable to the employment relationship51 and, 
more recently, also in terms of competent jurisdiction52 - has ruled that 
this criterion must be interpreted in a broad sense. When an effective 
centre of the worker’s activity cannot be easily identified, emphasis 
should be placed on the ‘place where, or from which, the employee in fact 
performs the essential part of his duties vis-à-vis his employer’. In order 
to identify the latter, the national court has to consider a series of 
indicators, such as the place of departure and return of the transport 
missions, the one in which the worker receives instructions on the 
missions and organises her/his work, as well as the one where work tools 
are53. The nationality of the aircraft is, instead, absolutely irrelevant54. 
                                                          
49 Regulation 593/2008 Art. 8(1). 
50 Regulation 1215/2012 Art. 23. 
51 ECJ 15 March 2011, C-29/10, Koelzsch, para. 43 and ECJ 15 December 2011, C-384/10, 
Voogsgeerd, para. 35. 
52 ECJ 14 September 2017, C-168/16 and C-169/16, Nogueira, para. 57, where it was also 
stated that, for the interpretation of EU legislation on jurisdiction in cases concerning 
employment, it must be taken into account of the corresponding provisions of the law on 
the legislation applicable to contractual obligations (para. 55). 
53 Nogueira, cit., para. 63, ECJ Koelzsch, cit., para. 49 and Voogsgeerd, cit., para. 38. 
54 Indeed, as noted by the Advocate General H. Saugmandsgaard Øe, in his Opinion on 
Nogueira case (points 123-127), ‘In the first place, no provision of Regulation No 44/2001 
contains any reference to the Chicago Convention or to the nationality of the aircraft on 
board which the workers carry out their work … In the second place, no provision of the 
Chicago Convention provides that the work carried out on board an aircraft must be 
regarded as being carried out on the territory of the State whose nationality the aircraft has 
… In the third place, the concept of “nationality of an aircraft”, provided for in Article 17 of 
the Chicago Convention, has neither the object nor the effect of assimilating the space 
inside an aircraft to the territory of the State whose nationality that aircraft has. That 
concept of nationality of aircraft is used (i) to define the scope of a number of provisions of 
that convention which apply only to aircraft having the nationality of one of the Contracting 
States (48) and (ii) to prohibit certain distinctions on the basis of that nationality … Since no 
provision of the Chicago Convention has the effect of assimilating the space within an 
aircraft to the territory of the State whose nationality that aircraft has, I see no good reason 
why work on board an Irish aircraft should be regarded as being carried out on Irish 
territory for the purposes of the application of Article 19(2)(a) of Regulation No 44/2001 … I 
infer from the foregoing that the nationality of an aircraft within the meaning of Article 17 of 
the Chicago Convention is irrelevant and cannot be taken into account by the national court 
for the purposes of determining the place where the cabin crew habitually carry out their 
work within the meaning of Article 19(2)(a) of Regulation No 44/2001’.   
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The Court thus rejects a solution focused on formal data, such as the 
content of the contractual clauses or the State of the aircraft’s 
registration, to privilege the concrete attitude of the relationship. Within 
this ‘empirical’ method a ‘significant role’ must be recognised - according 
to the Court of Justice - to the notion of ‘home base’55. In fact, even if the 
place of start and end of the flight crew’s performance cannot be made to 
coincide with the notion of ‘place in which (or from which) the employee 
habitually carries out his work’, it can undoubtedly constitute an 
‘extremely important’ indicator56 for the identification of the latter, 
enough to be considered a ‘rebuttable presumption’57. Some doubts, 
however, remain when there is a plurality of ‘home bases’, as, for 
example, in case of temporary agency work and generally of atypical 
work. Here, if a ‘place in which (or from which) the employee habitually 
carries out his work’ could not be identified, there would be nothing left 
but apply the law (and the jurisdiction) ‘of the country where the place of 
business through which the employee was engaged is situated’, according 
to Article 8, para. 3, Regulation 593/2008 (and Article 21(1)(B)(ii) 
Regulation 1215/2012)58. 
In addition to the issues discussed above, the domestic judges in 
Italy have faced also the problem of the legislation applicable when the 
employer does not comply with administrative obligations such as the 
communication to public offices of the changes in the labour relationships 
or the delivery to workers of mandatory documents. In particular, judges 
have proposed a solution which combines the criteria used to identify the 
social security applicable law and the ‘empirical method’ carried out by 
the ECJ concerning the law applicable to the employment relationship and 
the competent jurisdiction. On the one hand, as the administrative rules 
concerned have the same rationale of social security law, because both 
should be coordinated in order to protect as broad as possible workers 
and are directed to combat informal work, the social security criteria 
                                                          
55 Nogueira, cit., para. 66 et seq. 
56 D. Diverio, Dalla Corte di Giustizia un’importante precisazione sulla giurisdizione nelle 
controversie di lavoro relative al personale di cabina, 4 Rivista Italiana di Diritto del Lavoro 
877 (2017). 
57 M. Murgo, Personale di volo e competenza giurisdizionale nel caso Ryanair, 3 Diritto delle 
Relazioni Industriali 972 (2018). Conversely, the Advocate General H. Saugmandsgaard Øe, 
in his Opinion on Nogueira case, has claimed that the ‘home base’ would have an indirect 
relevance, as it should be taken into account only in so far as it supports the other 
indicators.    
58 N. Vascello, Giurisdizione e legge applicabile al rapporto di lavoro del personale impiegato 
a bordo di aeromobili tra nazionalità dell’aeromobile e base di servizio, 2 Diritto delle 
Relazioni Industriali 637 (2018). 
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should be applied59. On the other hand - taking into account that the 
cases in question regarded facts occurred before the adoption of 
Regulation 465/2012 and before the full implementation of Regulation 
883/200460 -, the concept of ‘place where a worker is employed 
principally’, used by Article 14(1)(B)(ii) Regulation 1408/1971 to identify 
the social security applicable law61, has been reconstructed following the 
reasoning of the Nogueira case, namely combining the notion of ‘place in 
which (or from which) the employee habitually carries out his work’, as 
defined by the ECJ, and that of ‘home base’. In other words, even when 
the research of the applicable administrative law with its related 
sanctions is at stake, the criterion of the legislation chosen by the parties 
(rectius by Ryanair) has to give the way to that of lex loci laboris62. 
Among the attempts of Ryanair to avoid the use of the ‘proximity’ 
criterion in order to identify the national applicable law, it is worth 
mentioning the exploitation of the different EU legislations across time. 
This is particularly true speaking of social security and employment 
administrative laws. Indeed, the airline company, supported by some 
national decisions, claims that for cases risen before the adoption of 
Regulation 465/2012, the concept of ‘home base’ would not be usable, 
otherwise Article 11(5) of the Regulation 883/2004 would be retroactively 
applied63. This last interpretation, however, can be easily discredited 
using the ‘empirical method’ elaborated by ECJ in Nogueira. Indeed, when 
a case is subjected to the application of Regulation 1408/1971, because 
originated before 2012, the meaning of ‘place where a worker is 
employed principally’, referred to in Article 14(1)(B)(ii), can be searched 
in the light of the ‘home base’ concept as defined in Annex III, Chapter Q 
of Regulation 3922/1991, namely on the basis of a legislation made 
before 201264. Therefore, the place of start and end of the flight crew’s 
                                                          
59 Tribunale di Bologna 24 September 2015, No. 17149; Tribunale di Pisa 8 October 2010, 
No. 380. 
60 Namely on 1 May 2010, see supra n. 42.  
61 More specifically, this disposition stated that ‘ … a worker employed in international 
transport in the territory of two or more Member States as a member of travelling or flying 
personnel and who is working for an undertaking which, for hire or reward or on own 
account, operates transport services for passengers or goods by rail, road, air or inland 
waterway and has its registered office or place of business in the territory of a Member 
State, shall be subject to the legislation of the latter State, with the following restrictions: … 
(ii) where a worker is employed principally in the territory of the Member State in which he 
resides, he shall be subject to the legislation of that State, even if the undertaking which 
employs him has no registered office or place of business or branch or permanent 
representation in that territory’. 
62 See Tribunale di Pisa 8 October 2010, No. 380.  
63 This position has been accepted by Tribunale di Bologna 24 September 2015, No. 17149. 
64 See Tribunale di Pisa 8 October 2010, No. 380. 
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performance is a fundamental indicator also to seek the social security 
and employment administrative legislations applicable before 2012.  
4. Ryanair’s anti-union practices and Trade Union 
responses.  
Since the beginning of its business activity, Ryanair has constantly 
managed to avoid and suppress Trade Unions. Essentially, Ryanair’s main 
goal is to negotiate the contractual terms directly with the individual 
worker to take advantage of her/his socio-economic weakness and 
smoothly implement the Ryanair business model. The evidences of 
Ryanair anti-union behaviour in Ireland are widespread65. Therefore, it is 
not surprising that also beyond its home country the airline company has 
been blamed for having a negative attitude towards workers’ 
organisations. Indeed, in a number of European States, controversies 
between Trade Unions and the low-cost airline have taken place, at 
various levels66. More recently, in a number of countries, the persistent 
pressure exercised by Trade Unions, also by means of collective actions, 
such as strikes, have succeeded in forcing the company at the negotiating 
table. So far, most of the collective agreements concluded concern 
employed pilots, while, apparently, the negotiation for cabin crew present 
more obstacles, which may be due to the weakest position of the cabin 
crew members, compared to pilots, in the labour relationship with the 
airline company67.  
                                                          
65 M. O’ Sullivan & P. Gunnigle, ‘Bearing All the Hallmarks of Oppression’. Union Avoidance 
in Europe’s Largest Low-cost Airline, 2 Labor Studies Journal 252-270 (2009); N. Cullinane 
& A. Dobbins, Considering the Impact of the ‘Right to Bargain’ Legislation in Ireland: A 
Review, 1 Industrial Law Journal 52-83 (2014). 
66 See M. O’ Sullivan & P. Gunnigle, supra n. 65, 262, who refers to shop floor disputes in 
Belgium that have involved also French, Spanish and Italian Trade Unions; on the anti-union 
policy in France, see Vandewattyne J. (2016), Ryanair ou le refus du dialogue social 
institutionnalisé, 8 La nouvelle revue du travail [En ligne], 
https://journals.openedition.org/nrt/2609 (2016)(accessed 15 October 2018). A dispute 
between Ryanair and the Danish Trade Unions is addressed in A. Decker, Ryanair and the 
Danish Model (Case Study Contribution to Textbook)(C. Mulhearn & H. Vane eds., Palgrave 
Macmillan 2016). 
67 In August 2018, the Irish pilots’ Trade Union Fórsa came to an agreement, confirmed by 
the ballot held in September, see https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-45280416 and 
https://www.shropshirestar.com/news/uk-news/2018/09/05/ryanair-pilots-vote-to-accept-
agreement-after-summer-strikes/ (accessed 6 Nov. 2018). It is again with a pilot’s union 
(SEPLA) the agreement signed for employer pilots based in Spain, in October 2018, see 
https://www.ilmessaggero.it/economia/news/ryanair_sindacati-4061232.html (accessed 6 
Nov. 2018). Earlier this year, BALPA (UK) has been officially recognised, see 
https://www.balpa.org/Media-Centre/Press-Releases/BALPA-signs-union-recognition-
agreement-with-Ryana [accessed 6 Nov. 2018] and, again, in October 2018, Ryanair has 
announced it has signed an agreement for directly employed pilots with BALPA (UK) and 
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In Italy, both confederated and grass-root Trade Unions have 
engaged against the company68 on several grounds: because of the 
failure to pay social security benefits in Italy, because of the working 
conditions and because of the anti-union practices, that is a persistent 
hindrance of Trade Unions’ activities, expressed in various ways. Over the 
years, the organisations have called for several strikes, of few hours, 
which have intensified in the latest months69. 
Among Trade Unions’ attempts to build a social dialogue with the 
company, the FILT-CGIL case is emblematic. Only in 2017, the Federation 
has repeatedly, and officially, asked to meet the company, to discuss 
working conditions and negotiate a framework agreement on the flow of 
information, without receiving any response70. 
In a couple of cases, FILT has opted for the judicial strategy, as well. 
The two judgments delivered by the Courts of Busto Arsizio and 
Bergamo, both won by the claimants, provide concrete evidence of the 
extent of the Ryanair’s anti-union attitude71.  
The Busto Arsizio Labour Court, after having declared its jurisdiction 
mainly on the grounds of Article 7(2) Regulation 1215/201272, has 
recognised the anti-union practice of the low-cost airline and the violation 
of Article 28 Law 300/1970, which protects Trade Unions whenever ‘the 
employer indulges in behaviours designed to deny or to limit the exercise 
of trade union freedom and union activity, as well as the right to strike’. 
Indeed, the plaintiff had given enough evidence of the refusal of the 
company to negotiate, to provide information and to cooperate with the 
workers’ representatives - also in the implementation of the norms on 
health and safety - as well as of the violation of Trade Unions’ rights for 
                                                                                                                                                      
SPAC (Portugal), see https://markets.ft.com/data/announce/detail?dockey=1323-
13835340-2D51E038ES7VQ7CQT6RSD34H97 (accessed 6 Nov. 2018). Less common are 
the agreements applicable to employed cabin crew, as the one signed by LBC-NVK 
(Belgium) on 25 October 2018, applicable to all Cabin Crew based in Belgium, as promptly 
announced by the company: https://vaaju.com/ireland/ryanair-has-reached-an-agreement-
with-belgian-unions/ (accessed 6 Nov. 2018). 
68 Evidence of the wide interest in the Ryanair’s workers is provided by the meeting 
requested to the Italian Minister of Transport, see http://www.filtcgil.it/documenti/ta6ott17-
1.pdf (accessed 15 Oct. 2018). 
69 The latest on 8 May 2018, which has triggered a prompt reaction from Ryanair that has 
created an ad hoc pop-up, to invite the costumers to sign a petition against strikes in airline 
companies, see http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/notizie/2018-05-08/uomini-radar-sciopero-
oggi-voli-rischio-tutta-italia-113410.shtml?uuid=AEExepkE (accessed 6 Nov. 2018). 
70 See http://www.filtcgil.it/index.php/aria/trasporto-aereo/diario-trasporto-aereo/ 
(accessed 6 Nov. 2018).  
71 For an assessment, see S. Borelli, supra n. 14. 
72 The jurisdiction of the Italian judge has been determined according to the criterion (set in 
Law No. 300/1970 Art. 28) of the place where the employer’s anti-union behaviour, which is 
a tort, has occurred. 
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agency workers. Eventually, in application of Article 28, the judge has 
ordered Ryanair to cease from the anti-union behaviours and cancel its 
effects73.  
Notwithstanding the uncontroversial conclusion of the Busto Arsizio 
Labour Court, FILT-CGIL, FIT-CISL and UILTRASPORTI had to resort 
again to calling a strike in Ryanair, on 10 February 2018, because of the 
failure of the company to engage in collective negotiations74. On the 
other hand, Ryanair has appealed the ruling and the trial before the Corte 
d’Appello is still to be decided. On 28 September 2018, the same Italian 
Trade Unions have joined a coordinated one-day strike against the low-
cost airline. On that day, pilots and cabin crew went on strike in Italy, 
Spain, Portugal, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany, which obliged 
Ryanair to cancel 250 flights. The claim, at least, for the Italian Trade 
Unions, remains the request to the company to start a collective 
negotiation with them in order to conclude a collective agreement of 
Italian law, to guarantee both pilots and cabin crew75 (as discussed 
below, FILT-CISL, the third most representative Trade Union, has rather 
opted for a conciliatory approach).  
On 30 March 2018, a further judgment has condemned Ryanair. 
FILT-CGIL had applied before the Bergamo Labour Court, claiming the 
discriminatory character of an employment contract clause that inhibits in 
absolute terms the Trade Union membership and collective actions. The 
clause (clausola risolutiva espressa) provides for the termination of the 
contract in case the worker takes part in Trade Union activities, including 
work stoppages, or communicates with the company via Trade Union 
representatives. The same clause adds that if the company is forced to 
recognise a cabin crew Trade Union or a collective action takes place, the 
employment contract is to be considered null and void76. In the case at 
stake, the Court founded its competence upon both Article 7(2) 
Regulation 1215/2012 and Article 28 Legislative Decree 150/2011, which 
aims at facilitating the judicial protection whether a discrimination takes 
place. 
Eventually, the judge declared the discriminatory character of the 
contested clause, on the grounds of personal beliefs of a Trade Union 
nature, by contextualizing it in the general anti-union approach that 
Ryanair had revealed in several occasions. Both the clause and the 
                                                          
73 Tribunale Busto Arsizio 5 February 2018, No. 448. 
74 See http://www.rainews.it/dl/rainews/articoli/scioperi-disagi-chi-vola-agitazioni-serie-
d6c3073c-ad97-4595-8422-37d80e1a31fc.html?refresh_ce (accessed 6 Nov. 2018). 
75 See https://www.independent.co.uk/travel/news-and-advice/ryanair-strike-2018-latest-
friday-september-live-cabin-crew-pilots-news-a8555561.html [accessed 6 Nov. 2018]. 
76 See Chapter 1, supra. 
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general context have a ‘demoralizing and deterrent effect’ as concerns 
the job application at Ryanair for those who are Trade Union members. 
Therefore, the direct discrimination occurs in the phase of access to 
employment, thus infringing upon Article 3(1)(A) Legislative Decree 
216/2003. The Court, in view of the persistency of the company’s anti-
union behaviour deemed necessary to impose both the proper diffusion of 
the Judgment and the payment of EUR 50,000 to FILT CGIL, as punitive 
damages to promote deterrence77. 
While the Italian labour courts were in the process of deciding the 
two cases, Ryanair was opening to the social dialogue with ANPAC 
(National Professional Association of Civil Aviation)78, a pilot’s 
organisation, which led to the official recognition of the association as 
company’s social partner, with an agreement signed on 7 March 201879. 
A recognition which is nothing but ambiguous and trivial, inasmuch as it 
only concerns a less representative Trade Union, both in quantitative and 
qualitative – only the pilots are concerned – terms. To the agreement 
that have recognised the pilot’s association, another has followed on 
pilot’s labour conditions, concluded in August 2018.  
ANPAC has newly engaged in a collective negotiation with Ryanair, 
together with other two Trade Unions: ANPAV and FIT-CISL, for cabin 
crew. The three organisations came to an agreement with the company 
on 17 October 2018, the same agreement has been signed on 28 October 
2018, by Crewlink and Workforce80.  
Ryanair, with this agreement, commits to apply to ‘all existing 
directly employed cabin crew’ Italian employment law and Italian social 
insurance within 1 October 2019. This clause suggests that Ryanair, and 
apparently the signatory Trade Unions, deem necessary a private clause 
to achieve what the supranational legal system already provides for: the 
application of employment and social security law of the place where the 
work is effectively carried out81. The company also commits to, 
progressively, employ directly some agency workers. A number of 
ambiguous aspects characterize the agreement, as the fact that it is 
signed by the Irish headquarter, while Ryanair has an Italian branch since 
                                                          
77 Tribunale di Bergamo 30 March 2018, No. 1586. 
78 The first meeting took place in early January, see the official note from ANPAC, available 
at: https://www.anpac.it/attachments/article/819/180108-CS-RYR-
incontro%20del%209%20gennaio.pdf (accessed 18 Oct. 2018).  
79 See, inter alia, 
http://www.repubblica.it/economia/2018/03/08/news/ryanair_firma_il_primo_accordo_coi_
piloti_italiani-190763621/ (accessed 18 Oct. 2018). 
80 FIT-CISL announces the agreement’s conclusion on its website, see 
http://www.fitcisl.org/41?documento_fit=5233 (last access 6 Nov. 2018). 
81 See Chapter 3, supra. 
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201382, or the fact that the agreement – especially the pay structure – is 
subject to individual acceptance of every worker, even the signatory 
Trade Unions’ members83. Obviously, this clause shifts the responsibility 
from the organisations to the individual workers. In addition, the 
agreement includes a detailed dispute resolution procedure and an 
industrial peace obligation for the time of validity of the agreement (1 
November 2018 – 31 December 2021), which prevents the signatory 
Trade Unions from organising any ‘unilateral industrial action’ that may 
undermine the agreement, ‘regardless of any dispute that may arise’84. 
Furthermore, the three organisations commit not to pursue any pay claim 
beyond what set in the agreement, nor any claim ‘(cost increase or 
otherwise) for any difference between Irish and Italian benefits, tax or 
social insurance as a consequence of moving to Italian employment 
law’85. 
FILT-CGIL and UILTRASPORTI strongly oppose the company 
agreement signed by ANPAC, ANPAV and FIT-CISL, which they define an 
‘accordo al ribasso’, that is an in pejus agreement which favours social 
dumping within the air sector. In a joint statement, the Trade Unions 
have pointed out that their aim is to conclude with the company a 
collective agreement ‘completely under Italian law’ that improves, or at 
least reiterates, pilots’ and cabin crews’ labour conditions provided for by 
the sectorial collective agreement. Therefore, they are determined to 
oppose any other agreement and to establish Trade Union representative 
bodies for FILT-CGIL and UILTRASPORTI (RSA) within Ryanair. Next to 
this, FILT-CGIL and UILTRASPORTI are lobbying the Ministry of Labour 
and Social Polices to make the sectoral collective agreement signed by 
the most representative Trade Unions generally applicable to hamper 
social dumping practices86.  
Before concluding, it is worthwhile to spend some words on the 
ballots organised in relation to both the agreements signed in the latest 
months. Right after the pilots’ agreement between ANPAC and Ryanair 
was signed, the association organised an on-line ballot restricted to its 
members, without applying any of the standards set by the sectorial 
                                                          
82 It is consolidated that the airline companies sign company agreements with the Italian 
branch. 
83 See Collective Labour Agreement FIT CISL, ANPAC, ANPAV & RYANAIR, 1 November 2018 
- 31 December 2021, paras 10.1-10.2. 
84 See Collective Labour Agreement FIT CISL, ANPAC, ANPAV & RYANAIR, 1 November 2018 
- 31 December 2021, para. 9.4. 
85 See Collective Labour Agreement FIT CISL, ANPAC, ANPAV & RYANAIR, 1 November 2018 
- 31 December 2021, paras 1.2, 1.4. 
86 FILT-CGIL, UILTRASPORTI. Piloti ed assistenti di volo Ryanair basati in Italia: perché 
diciamo no agli accordi siglati. Rome, 22 Oct. 2018. 
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collective agreement. According to ANPAC, 72% of the voters has 
approved the agreement. Subsequently, FILT-CGIL and UILTRASPORTI 
organised a further ballot on the same agreement open to all Ryanair 
pilots (also those not directly employed, who were anyway concerned 
with the agreement), following the sectorial collective agreement’s rules. 
The result was overturned and the agreement rejected by 82% of voting 
pilots, who have not appreciated a company agreement that lowers the 
labour standard set by Italian law87.   
Nearly the same approach has been adopted as regards the cabin 
crew agreement. The three Trade Unions have organised a ballot 
addressed only to their members, and 88% of voters have approved the 
agreement. Likely FILT-CGIL and UILTRASPORTI will soon organise a 
new, and inclusive, ballot, as for the pilots’ agreement, in order to show 
that the actual majority of Ryanair’s workers do not agree on agreements 
that increase the company’s power at the detriment of individual and 
collective rights. 
 Under Italian law, the ballot does not have a proper legal value as in 
other legal systems, it rather represents a – strong – political tool. 
However, Art. 21, Law 300/1970, imposes upon the employer the duty to 
allow Trade Unions to organise ballots, outside working hours, and it 
provides for ‘the right to participate to all workers belonging to the 
interested production unit and/or category’. This norm represents a 
strong legal ground to question the legitimacy, even if just political, of 
the ballots executed on the recent Italian Ryanair’s company agreements.  
5. Conclusions. 
From the analysis carried out in this essay, mainly two connected 
points of criticism emerge: first, the ability of Ryanair in exploiting the 
transnational dimension, both in legal and industrial relations’ terms, and, 
hence, the transnational dimension of the Ryanair issue; second, the 
workers’ difficulties in organising and tackling the Ryanair’s approach.  
As seen above, the poor working conditions in the airline company 
are the result of a systematic exploitation of the grey areas of 
transnational labour law, facilitated by the absence of Trade Unions, 
which is a direct consequence of the Ryanair’s manifest anti-union policy.  
Some important responses have been provided by the EU 
Institutions, especially by means of the ECJ decisions. Regardless of the 
ambiguities, which still persist (as for the uncertainties around the ‘home 
base’ concept), the criteria to identify the applicable contract law, the 
                                                          
87 https://www.ecodibergamo.it/stories/Cronaca/i-piloti-ryanair-bocciano-il-contrattonelle-
urne-del-referendum-82-di-no_1289175_11/ (last access 6 Nov. 2018). 
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applicable social security and administrative law as well as the competent 
jurisdiction are increasingly clear. However, the simple existence of these 
transnational issues, which hamper a full enforcement of national labour 
rights and, on the other hand, do not favour a strong transnational Trade 
Union response, is an indicator of the difficulties of the EU to build a 
social dimension. After all, transnational rules have been designed in an 
individual perspective, without a careful consideration of the collective 
profile of labour law88. It is worth mentioning that the EU has attempted 
to regulate the conflict of laws on strike, with a specific norm. The 
reference is to Article 9 Rome II Regulation89 which states that, in case of 
non-contractual liability for damages caused by an industrial action, the 
legislation of the locus actus – namely where the strike has taken place - 
must be applied90. Nevertheless, the lack of EU rules on strike is not 
surprising as Article 153, para. 5, TFEU explicitly excludes strike from the 
EU competences. For these reasons, the scarcity of collective 
transnational labour law rules is probably a relevant issue to be dealt with 
at EU level, as in the present globalised and integrated economic 
scenario, where undertakings have no boarders, limiting labour law to the 
individual dimension carries serious risk for workers’ rights and freedoms, 
which can be guaranteed only if supported by a collective freedom 
properly and equally protected, in accordance with the higher national 
standards91. The Ryanair case proves, generally speaking, that EU labour 
law is currently facing several difficulties in containing the diffusion of 
neoliberal economic practices, according to which Trade Unions represent 
a dangerous social monopoly for workers and for the market, so that 
                                                          
88 G. Orlandini, Il Tribunale di Busto Arsizio condanna Ryanair per condotta antisindacale, 
http://www.europeanrights.eu/public/commenti/Bronzini12-
Orlandini_nota_Busto_Arsizio.pdf (accessed 19 Oct. 2018). In the absence of any indication 
from the European law, for example, the Collective Labour Agreement FIT CISL, ANPAC, 
ANPAV & RYANAIR, 1 November 2018- 31 December 2021, para 1.1 claims that the 
agreement itself is governed by Italian law and the courts of Italy have jurisdiction over the 
disputes arising from its implementation. 
89 Art. 9 Regulation 864/2007: “Without prejudice to Article 4(2), the law applicable to a 
non-contractual obligation in respect of the liability of a person in the capacity of a worker 
or an employer or the organisations representing their professional interests for damages 
caused by an industrial action, pending or carried out, shall be the law of the country where 
the action is to be, or has been, taken”. 
90 On this rule see amplius F. Dorssemont & A. van Hoek, Collective action in labour conflicts 
under the Rome II Regulation (part I), 1 European Labour Law Journal 48-75 (2011) and 
iid., Collective action in labour conflicts under the Rome II Regulation (part II), 2 European 
Labour Law Journal 101-118 (2011). 
91 A. Loffredo, supra n. 4, 16. 
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labour relations should be founded exclusively on the individual 
employment contract92.    
However, to respond to these leanings and to fill the ‘collective’ gap 
left by transnational labour law, in the Ryanair case, Trade Unions have 
organised collective actions, claiming for better working conditions. In 
order to avoid the deterioration of its public image before the 
customers93, the airline company is partially opening to a form of social 
dialogue. In Italy, first, it has recognised a less representative pilots’ 
Trade Union and concluded a dubious agreement for pilots. Second, it has 
negotiated a cabin crew agreement with two minor organizations and one 
of the most representative Trade Unions. Ryanair's availability to 
negotiate the first company agreements, for both pilots and cabin crew, is 
an evidence of the topical value of strike actions, which remain, also 
nowadays, the main tool in the hands of the workforce. Indeed, the 
decision of the company to negotiate has causally followed months of 
strikes that have seriously undermined its credibility in front of the 
customers, as further demonstrated by the strong industrial peace clause 
included in the Italian agreements for cabin crew of October 2018. 
The Italian judgments on the anti-union conduct of Ryanair have 
been effective in shining a light on Ryanair’s violations. Nevertheless, 
their national nature is structurally unable to guarantee the construction 
of a transnational social dialogue in Ryanair, which could widely improve 
the working conditions, as the transnational nature of the activity 
requires a transnational approach. Therefore, the transnational 
coordination and solidarity among Trade Unions is a pivotal element to 
take actions, which can affect the consumers’ needs in a meaningful way 
and, as a consequence, force Ryanair to invert its anti-union tendency. 
In September 2017, the three Italian confederated Trade Unions, 
FILT-CGIL, FIT-CISL and UILTRASPORTI, had sent an official call for an 
international solidarity action against Ryanair to ITF (International 
Transport Workers’ Federation) and ETF (European Transport Workers’ 
Federation)94. But, with the FIT-CISL signature of the cabin crew 
agreement in October 2018, that the other Trade Unions completely 
oppose, the context has changed and the national divisions – among the 
                                                          
92 V. Speziale, La mutazione genetica del diritto del lavoro, 322 W.P. C.S.D.L.E. “Massimo 
D’Antona”.IT 19 (2017). 
93 It is worth noting that, besides the collective actions above mentioned, Ryanair had 
cancelled in the last months a huge number of flights, officially for the necessity of pilots to 
go on holyday but actually due to the transition of many of them to other airlines which 
guarantee better working conditions. Because of that Ryanair has had to face several 
disputes in order to compensate consumers.   
94 Available at: http://77.43.11.66/notiziari/2017/allegati/ALL164TA1.pdf (accessed 19 Oct. 
2018). 
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Trade Unions affiliated to EFT and ITF – risk to seriously affect the 
supranational organisations’ activism against Ryanair’s social dumping 
practices in the aviation sector. However, it is remarkable that Trade 
Unions in Europe are organising beyond official Trade Union Federations 
as well, and succeeded in organising an effective and coordinated strike 
action. 
